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DIMOND, NOT DAUBERT:
REVIVING THE DISCRETIONARY
STANDARD OF EXPERT ADMISSION
IN ALASKA
GREGORY R. HENRIKSON*
ABSTRACT
The law regarding the admission of expert testimony in Alaska has
undergone considerable change within the last few years, largely as a result of
the influence of federal law. This Article explores both the background of
Alaska and also charts the development of the law following a series of
influential federal cases. After reviewing this history, the author advocates
allowing trial courts broader discretion to exclude experts, but without
reliance on particular federal holdings. This discretion, the author argues, has
been an integral part of a uniquely Alaskan approach to expert testimony, but
has, unfortunately, been retracted in reaction to recent federal rulings.
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INTRODUCTION
How trial courts evaluate and admit expert testimony in Alaska has
come under increased scrutiny in the past decade. A number of
landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the 1990s
marked a change in the direction taken by federal courts and seemed to
signal the beginnings of a similar shift in Alaska’s courts. However, after
initially accepting the federal approach of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,1 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected subsequent
developments in the federal approach.2 The Alaska Supreme Court has
gone far in its rejection of what it has perceived as a trend towards
judicial intervention into the jury’s fact-finding role. This rejection has
thrown into doubt the traditional role of trial courts as gatekeepers of
proffered expert evidence. Unless the expert is offering a novel scientific
theory, the trial court no longer appears to have the authority to verify
the existence of sound methodology underlying the expert’s opinions, or
to bar those opinions which have no reasonable or logical basis. Under
current law, experts in Alaska must show only minimal personal
qualifications to be able to present an opinion to the jury, even if that
opinion has no basis in sound methodology or utilizes no methodology
at all. Any witness with bare-bones qualifications can proffer almost
unlimited testimony within the broad and largely self-defined
parameters of his expertise.
The Alaska Supreme Court’s reaction to the federal developments,
though based on a justified concern about putting judges in the role of
fact finder, has ultimately done a disservice to court and jury alike. It is
not sufficient to require disputes over expert methodology to be
resolved by adversarial process before a jury. Juries are only given a
limited set of facts and are not in a position to make admissibility
determinations. Leaving the matter solely to the adversarial process

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See infra Part III.B.
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invites an arms race of experts and the use of “hired gun” experts to
voice whatever opinion is needed.
Yet the Alaska Supreme Court need not blindly follow or
automatically adopt either the federal standard or the broad
exclusionary approach that they have taken. All that is needed is a
return to the common-sense, discretionary standard that held sway in
this state long before the current battle over Frye v. United States,3
Daubert, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael4 found its way into Alaska
courts. At the same time, Alaska could stay clear of the more invasive
approach utilized by some of the federal courts. Thus, where an expert is
able to voice a reasonable basis for an opinion that fairly fits the facts of
the case and would be helpful to the jurors, the expert ought to be able
to testify. There is no need for trial courts to substitute their own
judgment for the judgment of the juries. Courts, however, should be
permitted and encouraged to exercise their discretion to bar opinions
which are based on pure guesswork or which lack the support of sound
and logical methodology. Furthermore, trial courts should be given
sufficient leeway to exclude those opinions which are within the
comprehension of the jury, and therefore relate to facts which the jury
needs no expert help in weighing.
In Parts I and II, this Article examines the development of the
federal standard for admission of expert testimony and contrast it with
Alaska’s development. As will be shown, the two tracks have crossed at
critical points, but each has its own standards and practices. In Part III,
the Article explores emerging conflicts between the federal rules and
Alaska’s practices. Finally, this Article will argue that this conflict is
largely unnecessary because it is merely based on misunderstandings of
the federal system and a failure to draw from the wisdom of Alaska’s
own precedent.

I. CREATION OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD FOR ADMISSION OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY
It is useful for our purposes to examine exactly how the conflict
resolved by Daubert and Kumho Tire arose and to distinguish between
the general rules of expert admission and the particular rules pertaining
to novel scientific evidence. The famous Frye opinion forms part of the
backdrop to the problem. In that case, the court of appeals was asked to
review the exclusion of expert testimony regarding a primitive blood-

3. 239 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

2 - HENRIKSON__FINAL2.DOC

216

12/11/2008 2:50:15 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:2

pressure based lie detector.5 The court, with minimal discussion or
reasoning, held that “the systolic blood pressure deception test has not
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and
experiments thus far made.”6 It is surprising that such a short and terse
opinion would set the standard for admission of novel scientific theories
for decades to come, but that is more or less what happened. Courts
nationwide cited Frye and created the “Frye standard.” Under this
approach, the admissibility of a novel scientific theory was tied to its
acceptance in the scientific community. Opinions based on a theory,
however reliable, that had not yet obtained “general acceptance” were
excluded.7
The Frye approach was brought into question by the creation and
adoption of new codified evidence rules by the federal courts and many
states. These new rules included the following provision on the
admission of expert witnesses:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . .8
The rules further stated that “[p]reliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege,
or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”9
A faction of commentators and federal courts found a
“gatekeeping” requirement implicit in these rules.10 Under this
approach, the court has authority to assess preliminary admissibility,
and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence implies that to be
admissible the proffered testimony must take the form of “scientific,
5. Frye, 239 F. at 1013.
6. Id. at 1014.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the chart of an expert astronomer in a perjury trial over a false
photograph where “the technology . . . relied on was not ‘sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs’”)
(quoting Frye, 239 F. at 1014).
8. FED. R. EVID. 702.
9. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that “[t]he helpfulness test of Rule 702 . . . cast doubt on the continued
vitality of Frye” and discussing the emerging split in circuits); see also Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
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technical, or other specialized knowledge.”11 If the testimony is simply
an unsupported assertion, then it cannot fit this basic definition and
must be excluded.
The conflict came to a head in Daubert.12 There, the United States
Supreme Court faced the admissibility of an expert’s scientific opinion
as to whether Bendectin was a teratogen.13 The district court heard
extensive argument and expert testimony criticizing the methodology of
the plaintiff’s expert and ultimately held that “[g]iven the vast body of
epidemiological data concerning Bendectin, . . . expert opinion which is
not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish
causation.”14 The court of appeals affirmed, citing the Frye general
acceptance standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule
702 had replaced the “austere” Frye standard.15 The Court held that
under the new standard set by the rules, “the trial judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.”16
It is important to remember that the Daubert Court uses the term
“reliable” to refer to the specific and narrow concept of “evidentiary
reliability.”17 The Court was not using the term “reliability” in its
broader sense, and certainly an expert’s methodology that satisfies
baseline evidentiary reliability can still be found unreliable or even
unbelievable by the trier of fact. Under Daubert, trial courts are
instructed to undertake “a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.”18 They are not to substitute their own
determination of weight or credibility for that of the jury.19
To assist in this preliminary assessment, the Daubert Court created
its now-famous factors.20 These called for the trial court, after assessing
the basic “fit” of the proffered testimony, to verify whether the scientific
theory had been subjected to empirical testing, peer review and
publication, its known or potential error rate, and its general acceptance
11. FED. R. EVID. 702.
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13. Bendectin is a drug prescribed to alleviate the symptoms of morning
sickness, later pulled from the market. A teratogen is a drug or substance which
causes birth defects. Id. at 582.
14. Id. at 583–84.
15. Id. at 589.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 590 n.9.
18. Id. at 592–93.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 593.
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by the relevant scientific community.21 The Court noted that these were
not “a definitive checklist or test.”22 Subsequently, Rule 702 was
modified.23 The drafting committee recommended consideration of five
flexible factors:
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.”
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious
alternative explanations.
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation
consulting.”
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is
known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the
expert would give. 24
The Daubert Court admonished courts below that “the focus, of
course, must be solely on the principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.”25 This caveat was the subject of
challenge in the next major United States Supreme Court case to analyze
the admission of expert testimony, General Electric Co. v. Joiner.26 There,
the Court noted that:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from
existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.27

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000 Amendment).
24. See id. (Committee Notes on Rules—2000 Amendment) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
25. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
26. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
27. Id. at 146.
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This opinion has served as authority for excluding an array of
“hired gun” experts who churn out the same basic conclusion in
response to whatever facts happen to be at bar.28
The next major decision on admission of expert testimony was
Kumho Tire.29 The question before the Court was whether the Daubert
factors could be applied to non-scientific experts. The Court held that
Rule 702’s gatekeeping obligation applied to all experts, not just those
with “scientific” knowledge.30 The Kumho Tire court noted that the
Daubert list of factors is flexible and “neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district
court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
determination.”31 In this case, the Court examined the proffered
testimony of Carlson, a tire failure analyst, in detail.32 Based on a
physical examination and “experience,” Carlson opined that a defect in
the tire, not the owner’s misuse, caused a separation.33
The trial court initially excluded Carlson’s testimony, but the court
of appeals reversed on the grounds that Daubert applied only to
“scientific” experts and not to experts whose conclusions were based on
“experience.”34 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit
decision and upheld the original trial court determination.35 The Court
noted that trial courts must “make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field.”36 The Supreme Court itself
engaged in a scrutiny of Carlson’s methodology and found numerous
discrepancies and shortcomings.37

28. See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that Daubert is “germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired
gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same
scrutiny that it would among his professional peers”); Tyus v. Urban Search
Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In all cases . . . the district court must
ensure that it is dealing with an expert, not just a hired gun.”).
29. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
30. Id. at 141–42.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 144.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 146 (citing Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
35. Id. at 151.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 154–55. For example, the Court noted that Carlson’s methodology
was based on his two-factor “tactile” examination of the tire, a method without
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The impact of this line of cases has been felt far beyond the federal
court system. As of this writing, a majority of states have abandoned the
Frye standard in favor of Daubert or some modified version of Daubert.38
The Kumho Tire decision remains more controversial than Daubert, and
its adoption has been spottier. Commentators give varying reports on
the progress of its adoption. Some are quite sanguine.39 Others report
only a minority of states have gone along with the full federal approach
as represented by Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire.40 Alaska’s own
supreme court viewed Kumho Tire as restricting access to the courts.41
But there is absolutely nothing in the language of the case that makes it
“liberal” or “conservative,” nor does the case mandate exclusion of
experts. It gives trial courts discretion to keep the proverbial “gate” up
against experts unless they have something useful to add and have at
least a modicum of reliable methodology to support their conclusions.
There is no reason it should be a bar to litigants at all.

II. ALASKA’S PRE-DAUBERT STANDARD: THE EXPERT WITNESS IN
ALASKA FROM STATEHOOD
To see where Alaska’s standards for expert testimony ought to
head, it is useful to remember where they started. The earliest opinions
are not frequently cited in the context of adopting the latest

any support from other experts. Id. The court also noted inconsistencies in his
methods and contradictions in his testimony about his conclusions. Id.
38. See Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing
Debate Over Adopting the Test Established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 267 (2004-2005) (noting that “many
states have found Daubert’s interpretation of the way the Federal Rules of
Evidence regulate expert testimony to be persuasive, and a majority of states
have adopted Daubert or a test consistent with Daubert.”).
39. Robin Jean Davis, Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Courts and its
Impact on West Virginia Jurisprudence, 104 W. VA L. REV. 485, 502 n.84 (2002) (“[A]
majority of the states that have addressed the issue have adopted the
Kumho/Daubert test.”).
40. Steven B. Hantler, Mark A Behrens & Leah Lorber, Is the “Crisis” in the
Civil Justice System Real or Imagined? 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1172–73 (2005) (“A
number of states have adopted Daubert, but a significant number have not. In a
recent survey of state evidence law, it was found that only ten states have
adopted all three holdings in the Daubert trilogy. Six states have adopted Daubert
and Kumho Tire, but not Joiner. Eight states have adopted Daubert, but not Kumho
Tire or Joiner. Five states, while not fully adopting Daubert, use the Daubert
principles in their own tests. Eight states follow neither Daubert nor Frye. The
remaining states still apply Frye.”) (citations omitted).
41. See Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1005–06 (Alaska 2005); see also
infra Part III.B.
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groundbreaking federal opinion.42 However, these opinions offer a
distinctly Alaskan approach that, grounded in common sense, has much
to recommend it. These decisions did not use the current lingo or insist
on formal “Coon hearings,” “Daubert hearings” or any other wooden
mechanisms for pretrial analysis. The analysis typically took place in the
context of examining an expert’s “qualification,” but went well beyond a
simple review of licenses and personal background. The courts in these
early cases were in fact engaged in a gatekeeping analysis without
calling it that. The current confusion about how trial courts should
evaluate proffered expert testimony could be greatly reduced by a
return to this approach. The particular terms used or factors relied upon
are far less important than reviving the basic notion that Alaska’s trial
courts should have a relatively free hand to block baseless or unreliable
expert opinions.
A. The Origins of the Approach: Oxenberg v. State
The Alaska Supreme Court’s first significant inquiry into the
admission of expert testimony came in Oxenberg v. State.43 Oxenberg,
who had been convicted of arson, challenged the propriety of admitting
the Territorial Fire Marshall as “an expert witness on the subject of
fires.”44 The Fire Marshall conducted an investigation and concluded
that the fire “was of incendiary origin, and he followed this by testifying
in detail as to the facts upon which his opinion had been formulated.”45
Oxenberg argued that the jury was fully capable of determining the
origin of the fire without expert assistance, and that allowing an expert
to testify on the matter would constitute “an invasion of the province
and function of the jury and a substitution of the expert’s opinion for
that of the jury on the ultimate issue to be decided.”46
Justice Dimond, writing for the court, considered the issues in
balance:
If this was a matter of such common experience and
understanding that the jury could decide the question without
receiving assistance by way of an opinion from some other
person, then the opinion evidence should have been excluded

42. As we shall see, the most recent opinions from the Alaska Supreme
Court discussing Daubert and Kumho Tire do not appear to regard these early
cases as having any bearing on the question of gatekeeping.
43. 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1961).
44. Id. at 900.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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because it would be superfluous. But if under the particular
circumstances related here the jury could receive appreciable
help or assistance from the opinion of the expert witness, then
his testimony was admissible.47
The court upheld the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony,
explaining that “[q]uestions as to the admissibility of expert testimony
should be left to the wise discretion of the trial judge.”48 The court
reasoned that in the particular circumstances of the arson case, the
origin of the fire “could not have been properly understood or
determined without the aid of an opinion from a person of special
knowledge and experience.”49 The Territorial Fire Marshall had this
experience, and “had a sufficient acquaintance through personal
observation and other means of investigation to enable him to express
an opinion.”50 As to the propriety of an expert opinion on the ultimate
issue, Justice Dimond noted that under the new “Uniform Rules of
Evidence” under review by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, experts were permitted to testify as to the
“ultimate issues.”51
The Oxenberg opinion is probably best known in Alaska today for
being one of the seminal opinions on corroborative testimony in
criminal cases.52 It is fascinating to see, however, that all the basic
elements involved in the admission of expert testimony in a modern
federal case were present in the court’s reasoning, including the concept
of the gatekeeping role itself. Thus, although the case was decided prior
to the adoption of the uniform Federal Rules by Alaska’s courts, the
Oxenberg court’s reasoning set an excellent foundation for those rules.
Though the opinion is short, it is apparent that Justice Dimond
envisioned several critical components to expert admission. First, there
was the underlying notion that the trial court has broad discretion to
allow a proffered expert to testify.53 The court reviewed the choice as a
matter of discretion and implied that such discretion would not be
overturned absent a showing, as explained by subsequent decisions, that
the “reasons for the exercise of discretion are clearly untenable or

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at n.20.
52. See, e.g., Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Bodine v. State, 737
P.2d 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Pickens v. State, 675 P.2d 665 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984).
53. Oxenberg, 362 P.2d at 900.
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unreasonable.”54 Second, the Oxenberg court understood that only a
witness with suitable and applicable training and/or experience could
testify.55 The Territorial Fire Marshall was established as such a witness
to the satisfaction of the trial court because of his experience in the
field.56 Third, the court noted that this particular expert actually
investigated the case at hand.57 It is strongly implied, if not spelled out,
that this was a hands-on investigation and not merely a review of
records.58 Fourth, the court noted that the opinion must help the trier of
fact.59 If the opinion did nothing more than state a conclusion “of
common experience and understanding,” then the opinion would be
excluded as superfluous.60
Both the trial court and supreme court looked at who the expert
was, what his opinion was, what kind of review his opinion was based
on, and whether the jury actually needed expert help. At the same time,
the supreme court did not chide the trial court for taking a look at the
expert’s basic methodology (though they did not use that term), nor did
they forbid the trial court from second-guessing the decision of a party
to offer an expert’s testimony. The supreme court’s decision implied that
the trial court had discretion to exclude this qualified fire marshal if
either the jury did not need his assistance or if he never actually
investigated the matter.
B.

The Development of the Standard

The discretionary standard of expert admission established in
Oxenberg was developed and expanded in the decades before the furor
over Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire. In Ferrell v. Baxter,61 the trial court
allowed Rudy Voight, an acknowledged expert on automobile accidents,
to testify, but limited his opinion greatly.62 The trial court barred
admission of his opinions as to the truck’s speed, the “tracking

54. Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 695 (Alaska 1970).
55. Oxenberg, 362 P.2d at 900 (“[T]he witness was qualified to express an
opinion on the matter in issue.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. (“The record not only bears out those determinations, but also shows
that the witness had a sufficient acquaintance through personal observation and
other means of investigation to enable him to express an opinion.”).
58. Id. (noting “personal observation” as part of inspector’s methodology).
59. Id. (“[T]he origin of the fire could not have been properly understood or
determined without the aid of an opinion from a person of special knowledge
and experience.”).
60. Id.
61. 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971).
62. Id. at 269.
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tendencies of the trailer” and the trailer’s location relative to the center
of the road at impact.63 The basis for these rulings was said to be Voigt’s
lack of qualification and his impermissible attempts to testify to the
ultimate issue.64 Whether that was the whole story or not, the Alaska
Supreme Court ostensibly reviewed these exclusions simply as a test of
Voigt’s qualifications to testify.65 On that basis, they upheld the trial
court’s exclusion.66
A more detailed look at the Ferrell court’s reasoning reveals that, as
in Oxenberg, the court’s analysis of Voigt’s opinion involved a good deal
more than merely a checking of baseline qualifications. For example, in
determining whether Voigt could be allowed to arrive at a conclusion
regarding the speed of the collision based on a post-accident
photograph, the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned:
We can find no showing in the record to indicate that Mr. Voigt
had “reasonable contact with the subject matter” under
discussion. Mere observation of numerous accident scenes after
the fact would not necessarily make him an expert in this field.
Nor would extensive driving experience give him the
knowledge to tell from a photograph the speed of the vehicles
involved.67
The court is clearly going beyond a mere qualification inquiry in
this case, especially in light of the fact that Voigt had experience with
accident investigation and had been qualified to testify in previous
cases. If he was unqualified, why was he allowed to offer any testimony?
Furthermore, the “subject matter” at issue in a genuine dispute over
qualification would be a great deal broader than a particular accident
scene. One would expect an attack on his lack of training or experience.
The challenge here was more specific: whether Voigt could be permitted
to look at some photos, make his own experience-based assessment, and
announce a speed. The trial court forbade this, and the Alaska Supreme
Court upheld that decision. Yet in substance, this exclusion bears a
striking similarity to the sort of free-ranging, discretionary analysis
allowed under the flexible factors approach of Kumho Tire.68
63. Id. at 268–69.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 268.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Weaver v. Blake, 454 F.3d 1087, 1090–92 (10th Cir. 2006)
(affirming district court opinion regarding officer’s expert opinion on point of
vehicle collision and which vehicle crossed the yellow line); Cobb v. Dawson,
No. 5:06-cv-066 (HL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91177, at *14 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2007)
(considering challenge to expert’s opinion on impact and braking speeds under
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Likewise, the Ferrell court’s discussion of the trailer’s precise
position sounds a lot more like a reliability analysis under Daubert and
Kumho Tire than an initial review of “qualifications.” As the court stated:
Similarly, we find no merit in appellants’ third contention of
error that Mr. Voigt should have been permitted to answer a
question expressing an opinion as to the location of the rear of
the trailer relative to the center of the road at the time of
impact. Although the basis for the question was to be Voigt’s
observation of the truck, tracks and point of impact at the
scene, it called for more than his observations. It also asked
Voigt’s opinion. To give his opinion, Voigt had to qualify as an
expert able to determine the position of the vehicles at the time
of the collision based on a view of the scene after the accident.
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that Mr. Voigt did not possess sufficient knowledge
to assist the jury in determining this issue.69
Though couched in terms of Voigt’s “qualification,” the particular
opinion at issue was a classic Daubert issue—an expert’s opinion arising
from an inspection of the scene combined with prior experience. Because
this was well before both Daubert and Alaska’s adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,70 it is not surprising that the analysis was couched in
terms of “qualification.” But the analysis essentially determined whether
a particular expert had any reliable basis for coming to his particular
conclusions. In this case, the expert did not have a reliable basis for his
conclusions and was rightly rejected.
Another example of the early Alaska approach can be found in
Fairbanks v. Nesbett.71 In Nesbett, the court upheld exclusion of a

flexible factors approach and deeming it “unorthodox” but admissible under the
circumstances); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (D.N.D.
2006) (allowing accident reconstruction expert to testify on basic elements of
crash, but barring testimony regarding “‘phantom acceleration’ from a defective
speed control system, or any opinion testimony as to specific design defects of
the 1998 Ford Explorer”); Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1257 (D.N.D. 2004) (considering challenge to expert’s calculation of impact speed
based on Daubert and Kumho Tire); Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d
731, 748 (W.D. Va. 2004) (allowing expert opinion on speed of vehicle at impact,
“provided that the data from the restraints control module on the test and
accident vehicles is substantially similar”).
69. Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 268.
70. The Federal Rules of Evidence were largely adopted by the Alaska
Supreme Court acting in its administrative capacity, pursuant to Supreme Court
Order 364 effective August 1, 1979.
71. 432 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1967).
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proffered expert on a motorcycle’s stopping ability relative to a car.72
The expert’s testimony was elicited to show that the defendant, as an
inexperienced motorcycle driver, should have been going slower to
begin with because he would not have been able to stop quickly enough
at his speed.73 The court noted that the witness “presented no uniform
charts and admitted he had never conducted experiments on stopping
characteristics.”74 The trial court also found that testimony about a
motorcycle’s comparative stopping ability had little relevance to the
facts at issue: there was no testimony that appellee saw or could have
seen the vehicle before the accident, and “appellee’s unrebutted
testimony was that ‘there was just barely enough time to even reach for
the brakes.’“75 In modern parlance, there was no “fit” between the
methodology and the issues in contention.76
Thus, the irony of the current state of confusion is that none of it is
necessary. The Alaska Supreme Court crafted a sensible procedure for
reviewing the methodology of proffered expert testimony long before
the national controversy arrived in Alaska’s courts. Under these
precedents, which have never been overruled, trial courts should indeed
be permitted to act as gatekeepers that guard juries against experts with
nothing of substance to offer. The precise terminology or factors used to
describe this process is not important. Neither is the particular modern
evidence rule cited in authority. What is important is that trial courts be
reassured that they have the authority to take a hard look at proffered
opinions and to block them, or even to exclude all experts if they will do
more harm than good to the fact-finding process.
C.

Qualification of the Expert to Testify Versus Qualification of the
Expert as an Expert

Although the precise terminology used is not the critical part, it can
give rise to confusion, particularly regarding an expert’s “qualification.”
This is an ambiguous concept. In most recent cases, an expert’s
“qualification” is nothing more than the evidentiary foundation

72. Id. at 612.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no
fit where a large analytical leap must be made between the facts and the
opinion.”) (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (offering
animal studies showing one type of cancer in mice to establish causation of
another type of cancer in humans is “simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion offered”)).
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(sometimes established at a brief bench hearing) of his underlying
personal expertise.77 However, the Alaska courts’ use of an expanded
“qualification” in these older cases makes some sense, even if it is
confusing. After all, nobody is “qualified” to offer an ipse dixit opinion
unless the witness in question is coming down from a fiery mountain
with a brace of stone tablets.78 In this sense, however, the “qualification”
analysis is looking at the expert’s methodology, not just his curriculum
vitae. As the case law has developed, consideration of “qualification”
has been relegated to a purely foundational, threshold analysis with
little, if any, attention paid to the opinion or underlying methodology.
Rather, the court’s focus is on the training and background of the expert
himself.79
Under Alaska law, the baseline test for personal qualification as an
expert witness is whether the witness “has the requisite intelligence and
reasonable contact with the subject matter to allow him to demonstrate
his expertise with reasonable skill.”80 There is no requirement that the
witness devote full time to the specialty.81 There is also no requirement
that the witness have any advanced education, or indeed any formal
education at all.82 Such decisions regarding an expert’s personal
qualification are left to the sound discretion of the trial courts.83
Yet the question of an expert’s basic, personal qualification as an
expert is separate and distinct from the question of whether the
proffered opinion is helpful or based on some reliable methodology. It is
therefore possible for a fully qualified expert to offer an opinion devoid
of any utility for the trier of fact. One of the classic types of opinions
rejected by courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence is the so-called

77. See id. at 1296–98.
78. Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 117 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
conclusion without any support is not one based on expert knowledge and
entitled to the dignity of evidence.”) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509
U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
79. See, e.g., Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 256–57 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding trial court’s decision to allow fingerprint analyst with training in tool
marks to testify as to tool marks).
80. Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 693–94 (Alaska 1970).
81. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 270 (Alaska 1970) (citing Lewis, 469 P.2d at
693).
82. See, e.g., Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc., 996 P.2d 101, 103 (Alaska 2000)
(reversing trial court’s exclusion of pilot testifying as to mechanical question
where apparent basis was lack of formal licensing).
83. See Pedersen v. State, 420 P.2d 327, 335 (Alaska 1966) (“[T]he decision in
regard to the requisite qualifications of an expert witness is left to the trial
court’s discretion and is reviewable only for abuse.”); see also City of Fairbanks v.
Nesbett, 432 P.2d 607, 611–12 (Alaska 1967); Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189,
192–93 (Alaska 1965).
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ipse dixit opinion.84 Such an opinion is propped up solely by the expert’s
impressive qualifications. The expert announces, in effect, that the
opinion is so because he says it is so.
In spite of the fact that the federal standard and the state standard
do not really stand at odds, the clash of terminology has made the
standard’s application today extraordinarily confusing. For example, in
Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc.,85 a passenger sued the airline for alleged
barotrauma arising from pressure variations he claimed to have
experienced on a shuttle to the North Slope.86 The plaintiff sought to
introduce testimony from an airplane pilot, John Spencer, regarding
alleged negligence in maintaining the Convair’s pressurization system.87
The trial court precluded his testimony in part, preventing him from
testifying about the standard of care for aircraft maintenance or opining
on Era’s negligence.88 Although the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court because of a split decision, it reasoned that Spencer had
satisfied the minimal “qualifications” for testifying as an expert even if
he was not licensed as a mechanic, since “as a pilot, Spencer is required
to possess significant knowledge about the proper maintenance of the
planes he flies.”89 The supreme court held that a trial court is expected to
balance “the value of the evidence against the danger of undue
prejudice, distraction of the jury from the issues, and waste of time”
when ruling on whether to exclude an expert based on qualifications.90
The Barrett court cited Lewis v. State91 for this odd proposition, but
Lewis simply held that the trier of fact should be permitted to hear
qualified expert testimony where the jury “would have benefited” from
the proffered testimony.92 In fact, the text quoted from Lewis comes from
a different portion of the Lewis opinion that addresses the question of
whether the court felt the proffered expert testimony was unfairly
prejudicial.93 This is often referred to as a Rule 403 analysis.94 It has no
84. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
85. 996 P.2d 101 (Alaska 2000).
86. Id. at 102.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 103–04.
90. Id. (quoting Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 695–96 (Alaska 1970)).
91. 469 P.2d 689 (Alaska 1970).
92. Id. at 694–95.
93. Id. at 696 (“The trial judge may have felt that the testimony . . . would
have been unduly prejudicial against the state. We have previously stated that in
determining whether to admit or exclude demonstrative evidence, the trial judge
must balance the value of evidence against the danger of undue prejudice,
distraction of the jury from the issues, and waste of time.” (citing Love v. State,
457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969))).
94. ALASKA R. EVID. 403.
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direct bearing on the question of expert admission, except to the extent
that the expert’s opinion or his demonstrative aids create some special
threat of unfair prejudice. Moreover, the trial court’s ruling in the Barrett
case is fully in keeping with earlier Alaska cases, where trial courts were
permitted to keep experts from straying too far beyond the bounds of
their knowledge or their ability in a particular case.95
The Barrett court’s confusion on this point arises from the
confounding nature of the “qualification” analysis. The trial court
examined more than Spencer’s resume, looking to the opinions he was
proffering and what methods he used to support it. Given the precedent
already examined, the trial court should have been able to do this, even
though this inquiry technically goes beyond “qualification” into a
review of methodology and fitness. The cure for this problem is simple.
Courts should clarify the distinction between threshold questions of
expert qualification and more detailed questions regarding the reliability
of expert opinions.

III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD IN ALASKA: ACCEPTING DAUBERT
BUT REJECTING KUMHO TIRE
The relationship between Alaska and the federal standard has been
a complicated one. First, the Alaska Supreme Court accepted Daubert
and applied its more rigorous gatekeeping standard to scientific
experts.96 However, the court later rejected Kumho Tire and, in the
process, adopted a standard that leaves the trial courts with little
gatekeeping authority regarding non-scientific experts.97 This approach
has the distinct disadvantage of both placing Alaska courts in the
precarious terrain in which the federal courts found themselves before
Kumho Tire and also making it easier for unqualified hired guns to
qualify as experts. What is most distressing about this situation is that,
as argued above, Alaska had already laid the groundwork for an
effective and distinctly Alaskan approach to expert testimony even
before the drafting of the Federal Rules.

95. See Barrett, 996 P.2d at 102; accord Pedersen v. State, 420 P.2d 327, 335
(Alaska 1966); City of Fairbanks v. Nesbett, 432 P.2d 607, 611–12 (Alaska 1967).
96. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 395 (Alaska 1999); see also infra Part III.A.
97. See Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1005–06 (Alaska 2005); see also
infra Part III.B.
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A. Frye and Daubert Battle in Alaska
From the broad questions of expert admissibility, we move to the
much narrower question of the in-court use of novel scientific methods
or theories. Testimony arising from hypnotherapy has long been a
controversial subject in United States courts. The issue came to a head in
Alaska with the State v. Contreras98 decision, where the purported
victims of crime had their memories refreshed via hypnosis prior to
identifying the defendant.99 The defendants argued that there would be
no way for the witness or any expert to be sure what part of the posthypnosis testimony was real and what part was the product of
suggestion or confabulation and that the witness would be prone to false
confidence in the revived memories.100 The lower courts came to
opposite conclusions on the question.101 The Alaska Supreme Court took
review of the decision and held as a matter of law that a witness who
has been previously hypnotized may “testify only to facts which he
related prior to hypnosis.”102 The court considered “a variety of
empirical and theoretical works” regarding the definition and reliability
of hypnosis and concluded that “it is apparent that suggestibility poses a
fundamental problem with admitting hypnotically induced statements
or recollections.”103
Over a decade later, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited the
question in State v. Coon.104 In Coon, the defendant was charged with
terroristic threatening for leaving voicemail messages.105 The State
proffered the testimony of a voice analysis expert “who compared the
voice on the answering machine with verbatim voice exemplars
provided by Coon.”106 The trial court allowed the testimony.107 The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the State had failed to establish,

98. 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. at 794–95. The Contreras appeal actually involved two cases where the
trial courts had come to conflicting decisions. Id.
100. Id. at 795–96.
101. Id. at 794–95. Judge Serdahely ruled that the witness “could not testify at
trial regarding any matter discussed by her with the hypnotist during the
hypnotic session.” Id. at 794. Judge Buckalew ruled that any undue influence of
the hypnosis was “a matter affecting [the witness’s] credibility to be determined
by the jury and not a matter of competency to be determined by the court.” Id. at
794–95.
102. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 130 (Alaska 1986).
103. Id. at 131 (footnote omitted).
104. 974 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska 1999).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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pursuant to Frye, that the scientific community “generally accepted
voice spectrographic analysis.”108
The supreme court reversed, rejected Frye, and seemingly adopted
the federal standard for admission of expert testimony.109 The Coon court
first examined the Alaska Rules of Evidence, noting that under Rule
104(a) of the Alaska Rules of Evidence the trial court has a “duty to
determine preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness and the admissibility of evidence.”110 The court
noted that relevant evidence was generally admissible unless barred by
Rule 403 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, and that under Rule 702,
experts were allowed to offer “helpful opinion testimony” that, under
Rule 703, can be based on “facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field.”111 The court held that:
[E]xpert opinion evidence is admissible if the trial court
(exercising its authority under Rule 104(a)) determines that (1)
the evidence is relevant (Rule 401); (2) the witness is qualified
as an expert (Rule 702(a)); (3) the trier of fact will be assisted
(Rule 702(a)); (4) the facts or data on which the opinion is based
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions upon the subject (Rule 703); and (5)
the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its
prejudicial effect (Rule 403).112
Furthermore:
Our evidence rules give trial courts both the authority and the
responsibility to determine the admissibility of such evidence
without being limited to the general acceptance standard. They
preclude this inquiry from focusing exclusively on general
acceptance or any other single factor. Our evidence rules
contemplate a broader inquiry, allowing a proponent to
establish admissibility even if general acceptance is absent, and
allowing an opponent to challenge admissibility even if general
acceptance is present.113
Thus, for scientific experts offering a novel theory, the court held
that trial courts would be permitted to subject an expert’s theory to a

108. Id.
109. Id. at 395 (holding Daubert the standard for admission of expert
testimony).
110. Id. at 392–93.
111. Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted) (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 702).
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Id.
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Daubert inquiry rather than being limited to testing for general
acceptance.114 At the same time, the court said nothing definite in Coon
about how or even if trial courts would be permitted to scrutinize a nonscientific expert’s testimony. That question was answered for the federal
courts in Kumho Tire shortly after Coon was handed down.115 For several
years there was an open question as to whether Alaska courts would
adopt this broadened application of Daubert.116 At the same time, there
was a growing confusion over exactly what discretion trial courts had in
scrutinizing proffered testimony.117
B.

Marron v. Stromstad Rejects Kumho Tire and Repudiates
Gatekeeping

After adopting Daubert in Coon, the Alaska Supreme Court
strangely rejected Kumho Tire’s expansion of the federal standard in
Marron v. Stromstad.118 In that case, the court considered whether a
treating physician proffering expert testimony as to the potential for
future treatment should be subject to a Coon reliability analysis.119 As to
the physician, the court decided that “when a treating physician testifies
regarding a course of treatment, the physician’s testimony need not be
subjected to a Daubert analysis.”120 The Marron court considered and
expressly rejected the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Kumho
Tire.121 The court limited Coon “to expert testimony based on scientific
theory, as opposed to testimony based upon the expert’s personal
experience.”122
The supreme court further rejected an effort to apply the Coon
analysis to reconstruction expert Jim Stirling.123 The court noted that
Stirling satisfied the “liberal admissibility standard” for expert

114. Id.
115. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146–49 (1999).
116. See Ratliff v. State, 110 P.3d 982, 985 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (noting that
the Alaska Supreme Court had not yet adopted Kumho Tire); Vent v. State, 67
P.3d 661, 669–70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (applying Kumho Tire); Bourdon v. State,
Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *7 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002)
(“Neither this court nor the Alaska Supreme Court has ruled on the
admissibility of a child abuse expert’s testimony after Daubert and Coon.”).
117. See supra Part II.C.
118. 123 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2005).
119. Id. at 1001.
120. Id. at 1002.
121. Id. at 1004.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1003.
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witnesses.124 That standard, as now expressed, “allows any person with
specialized knowledge to serve as an expert witness, so long as that
knowledge is relevant, in that it can help the trier of fact understand
evidence or determine facts in issue.”125 What is notably missing is
approval of any gatekeeping role beyond the bare rubber stamping of
threshold relevancy and some level of qualification. Likewise, the court
rejected any reliability analysis for the expert Dr. Rubenstein. The court
acknowledged that “the superior court admitted the testimony of
Stirling and Dr. Rubenstein based on the reliability of their expertise in
general, rather than its application in this particular case.”126 The court
endorsed this analysis,127 implying strongly that trial courts should no
longer examine the application of expertise to any particular case. The
new holding threatened to overturn earlier Alaska Supreme Court
opinions that rejected experts for gaps between experience and opinion
or for lack of reliable methodology. Fortunately, the Marron court did
not overtly address this discrepancy, and some hope remains that trial
courts will be given back the latitude they once enjoyed to make basic
reliability and fitness determinations of all proffered experts.
C.

The Mess Marron Has Made

The Marron court’s rejection of Kumho Tire and admonishment
against excluding any non-scientific experts has left Alaska trial courts
in a difficult position. The new rule appears not only to limit the formal
Daubert factors to hard science, but also to limit the trial court’s role to a
merely rubber stamping a baseline level of qualification. This approach
has led to serious practical problems and rests on questionable logic.
First, the practical impact of Marron has been strong. For example,
in Marsingill v. O’Malley,128 the court rejected an attempt to apply the
reliability analysis of Coon to expert physicians testifying as to the
appropriate level of care.129 The court reasoned that:
Dr. O’Malley’s experts possessed the relevant personal
experience. Each had extensive experience with patients and
was routinely called upon to respond to patients’ questions

124. Id. at 1002 (quoting John’s Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1034
(Alaska 2002)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1004.
127. Id. at 1004–08. The supreme court did not explain how to analyze the
reliability of expertise in general, other than by verifying the existence of a CV
and minimal credentials.
128. 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006).
129. Id. at 160.
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during late night telephone calls. In addition, Dr. Braddock had
completed several studies on the amount of information that
doctors give patients in a variety of circumstances. As the trial
court correctly observed, “an understanding of what a patient
needs to know . . . and understanding what a doctor needs to
say, is . . . related to what doctors do.” We have consistently
recognized that experience-based expert testimony is
admissible when the expert witness has substantial experience
in the relevant field and the testimony might help the jury.130
This sweeps very broadly indeed. The Marsingill court appears to
be holding that the opinions of non-scientific experts should not
undergo any reliability scrutiny. The trial court is essentially given a
two-part checklist: if the witness has experience or other qualification,
and if his proffered testimony has any theoretical applicability to a
matter in contention, then it must be admitted. No further analysis is
permitted unless the proffered testimony involves a novel scientific
theory.
Though this approach furthers the Alaska Supreme Court’s policy
of liberally admitting expert testimony, it also opens the door to abuse.
Parties can ensure that their experts avoid any serious scrutiny by
classifying the experts’ testimonies as experience-based rather than
scientific. Experts are free to announce whatever conclusions they need
to provide in order to support the side they wish to see victorious.
Though cross-examination can provide some safeguards against this
sort of abuse, the inquiry at that stage is obviously restricted by the rules
of admissibility and any other limitations on permissible lines of
questioning. A court in a pretrial hearing can make free inquiry into the
expert’s methodology without fear of prejudicing the jury or opening
the door to otherwise impermissible evidence. Furthermore, reliance on
a jury with little background on the case to determine who is a real
expert and who is a charlatan abdicates the court’s role as gatekeeper.
The current regime in Alaska is similar to the world-turned-upsidedown the federal courts grappled with in the period between Daubert
and Kumho Tire. Those experts who offer experience-based testimony are
essentially given a free pass, while those who go to the trouble of
applying some level of scientific rigor are held to a much higher
standard. Moreover, even if Coon’s adoption of Daubert were complete,
and not merely a limited adoption solely to liberalize the standard, this
would not end the problem. A whole line of federal decisions evolved

130. Id. (citation omitted).
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during that misty period devoted to resolving the alchemical distinction
between “scientific testimony” and other types of testimony.131
In addition to the practical problems in its wake, the Marron court’s
reasoning may well be called into question. The court cited criticism of
Kumho Tire, but on closer examination some of this seems to be
misplaced. For example, the Logerquist v. McVey132 decision was cited
with approval in Marron.133 Contrary to the Marron court’s insinuation,
however, the Arizona court in Logerquist both retained Frye and rejected
Daubert.134 Moreover, the Logerquist opinion has been met with
considerable criticism and confusion.135 The court also relied on the
Montana opinion, Gilkey v. Schweitzer.136 Montana’s approach has
created considerable confusion about what standard the Montana courts
are applying.137
Furthermore, there is a real question as to whether a rejection of
Kumho Tire was even needed in order to uphold the trial court. As Chief
Justice Bryner noted in his concurring opinion: “In my view, the
superior court’s evidentiary rulings can easily be sustained as correct

131. See, e.g., Richard T. Stilwell, Monitoring the Opinions of Biochemists and
Beekeepers: The Application of Daubert & Robinson to Engineering Witnesses in
Texas, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 95, 101 (1999); Gerald J. Todaro, The Admissibility of
Medical Testimony in Ohio: Daubert, Joiner and Ohio’s Relevance-Reliability
Standard, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (1998); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert
Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV.
939, 951–55 (1995–96).
132. 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
133. Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1006 (Alaska 2005) (“Expanding
Daubert’s scope to include all expert testimony seriously exacerbates these
problems. Several states have agreed, and have declined to adopt the expansion
of Daubert that Kumho Tire accomplished.”) (footnote omitted).
134. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 125–30.
135. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority’s
Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 136 (2001) (“[I]t would be a
grave mistake to construe Rule 104(a) as requiring the trial judge to
unquestioningly accept facially sufficient foundational testimony.”); David L.
Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of
Ignorance of Science Is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 89 (2001) (“Logerquist appears
to be mainly an aberration. It is a dead-end detour along the path to scientific
competence among judges and lawyers.”); Crane McClennen, Frye, Daubert, and
Logerquist: Is Arizona Moving Ahead or Going in Circles?, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 571, 584
(2002).
136. 983 P.2d 869 (Mont. 1999).
137. See, e.g., State v. Clifford, 121 P.3d 489, 500–01 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J.,
concurring) (“[W]e have, since, essentially done away with the Daubert
standards by limiting the requirements of that case and the courts’ gatekeeping
obligation to proffered expert testimony of “novel” scientific evidence only. In
doing so, we have committed an error of logic.”) (citations omitted); Robert L.
Sterup, Into the Twilight Zone: Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony in
Montana after Daubert, 58 MONT. L. REV. 465, 485–86 (1997).
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applications of Daubert and Kumho. The opinion’s categorical refusal to
extend these cases to experience-based expert testimony is unnecessary,
overbroad, and unsound.”138 As Justice Bryner correctly noted, there
was no indication that the trial court’s reasoning would be rejected by a
federal court under Kumho Tire.139 One of the main thrusts of that
opinion was that the Daubert factors may or may not be applicable and
that the trial courts should exercise their own discretion on what factors
to apply.
Of course, there is an argument that allowing more expert
testimony into court is a good thing because it allows both sides to
present their best cases to the jury with minimal interference from the
court. Alaska has a long tradition of respecting the wisdom of juries,
particularly when any factual issues are in question. Perhaps more than
federal courts, Alaska’s civil system keeps the jury at the center of civil
litigation. The Alaska Supreme Court is apparently concerned that if the
full federal standard were adopted, Alaska trial courts will become
austere and rigid, keeping each side from having its say and interfering
too much in the weighing of evidence.140 Even assuming Alaska’s trial
courts would go down that road, a better solution would be fleshing out
the limits of the gatekeeping process—not abolishing the gatekeeping
process altogether.

IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
Casting Alaska trial courts into these murky realms is not in
keeping with the long tradition of common sense and broad discretion
in this state. The courts are busy enough without having to study the
convoluted mass of federal case law in an attempt to distinguish who is
a “scientific” expert. There is a strong tendency to simply let anyone
with a degree or sufficient experience into court with the hope that the
adversarial process will sort out any problems. The introduction of
experts is no longer a court-controlled process, but a party-controlled
process. Yet, at the same time, these witnesses are still granted
enormous testimonial privileges that no mere fact witness can claim.
They can fill in critical evidentiary gaps on causation for a plaintiff. They
are also given ostensible approval as “experts.” By allowing the parties
to take total control of the process and leaving any criticism of the
methodology or reliability to be hashed out on cross examination, the

138. Marron, 123 P.3d at 1014 (Bryner, C.J., concurring).
139. Id. (Bryner, C.J., concurring).
140. See id. at 1005–06.
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current system has essentially abandoned the proverbial gate which
Alaska courts long guarded.
The Alaska Supreme Court should revisit the broad rejection of
Kumho Tire in Marron and ask whether either opinion was really
necessary. The groundwork for a distinctly Alaskan approach was
actually put in place decades before any of these opinions, and the best
guidance for trial courts may well be a return to that common-sense,
discretionary standard. This is actually in keeping with the discretionary
standard the Supreme Court endorsed in Kumho Tire.
The Alaska courts should remember the importance of the central
question—is this expert offering anything to the jury? For it is the jury
the expert must help, not merely the interest of one party or the other. If
the proffered testimony is nothing more than an unsupported opinion or
agreement-for-hire garnished with the imprimatur of “expert,” then it
will not be helpful to the trier of fact. Indeed, it stands a good chance of
confusing them and unfairly prejudicing the case.
Turning to some of the seminal cases that came down after
statehood, we find surprising insight that may help guide future
determinations. While the language used in these earlier opinions did
not include any of the modern Daubert and Kumho Tire jargon, a careful
reading shows that trial courts of the time were in fact performing as
gatekeepers. They were entertaining not just foundational questions of
qualification but were conducting very detailed oversight. The courts
were not afraid to preclude testimony if an expert’s reach exceeded his
grasp. There was no federal authority in play then, of course, since
Alaska had not adopted the Federal Rules. But the courts in Alaska came
to pretty much the same conclusion by 1961 that the United States
Supreme Court came to in 1999. The Alaska Supreme Court saw it as
entirely appropriate for trial courts to scrutinize both the expert’s
expertise and his proffered testimony. It was only in more recent times,
with the confusing acceptance/rejection of the federal standard, that the
role of trial courts has become confused. Oxenberg, Ferrell, and other
decisions should be looked to as authority today. They are, after all, still
good case law, and the basic premise underlying their approach is
sound.
Under this approach, trial courts would be permitted broad
discretion when considering the qualifications of the expert and whether
his proffered testimony ought to be admitted. This discretion would
expressly not require any particular formal hearings or rules but could
be applied as and when needed, provided the court had an opportunity
to hear from both sides. Requiring the court to hold a formal hearing, as
some cases have suggested, would undercut the discretion and make
simple issues far more complicated. For example, if a challenged expert
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can, after reasonable opportunity, offer no methodology of any kind for
his conclusion, the trial court ought to have discretion to exclude that
expert without undergoing an extensive pretrial voir dire. Trial courts
used to have that authority in Alaska, but it appears to have been pulled
away for no good reason.
Trial courts would also be free to engage in a flexible, commonsense reliability review of methodology for all experts. It is clear that the
Alaska Supreme Court has been very reluctant to follow the more
aggressive federal opinions regarding expert testimony and is very
reluctant to allow a judge to substitute his opinion for that of the jury.
However, the choice between an activist federal approach and limiting
review to bare qualifications is a false choice. The middle ground has
already been discovered by our forebears and needs only be revived and
fleshed out. A trial court should be free to take a basic look at how the
experts came to their conclusions. This need not and should not involve
a second-guessing or credibility analysis. But if, for example, an expert
wants to testify as to the cause of an auto crash, he should be able to
explain to the court’s satisfaction how he used his expertise to come to
that conclusion. If he did nothing more than put some new names in a
pattern report and sign off on it, then he should not be permitted to offer
that opinion. He should be able to “show his work” to the court. With
this discretion in place, the need for the formal rules of Frye or Daubert is
thrown into question. These may or may not be utilized as the trial court
sees fit, but in most cases they would not be needed and should not be
required.
Trial courts should also be free to ask the elemental question—is it
needed? This question, among the most basic of all questions dealing
with the admission of expert testimony, has largely been overlooked in
the debate. As Justice Dimond noted in Oxenberg, however, if the jury
doesn’t need experts, then experts should not be admitted. That little
kernel of wisdom would go a long way towards ensuring that basic
traffic cases and routine criminal matters not get bogged down with
costly expert arms races or battles.
At the same time, in keeping with the longstanding tradition of
liberal admission of relevant testimony in Alaska, the goal is not and
must not be substitution of the trial court’s opinion for the expert’s. Nor
should the fact that the expert’s peers disagree with him be grounds for
exclusion. Rejection of Frye has helped to cement these principles. Yet
the gate at the threshold should not be left open. Bare-bones
qualification regarding an area of expertise should not be all that is
required.
To this end, the Alaska Supreme Court should return to the
common-sense approach adopted in the state long before Daubert or
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Kumho Tire. The name put on this process is not important. Rather, the
process must allow trial courts to be free to block from the witness stand
those offering pronouncements without support, even if their
credentials are fine. The sweeping admonitions of Marron and other
recent opinions which appear to forbid any gatekeeping beyond a
rubber-stamping of bare qualification should be retracted or clarified.
Gatekeeping is an important aspect of the court’s discretion, and it is
imperative that trial courts be given this authority once again. As far as
concerns about access to the judicial system and judges taking the place
of juries by excluding experts, these issues arose outside Alaska and
have limited application to this state.141 One is reminded of Shane’s
admonishment, that “a gun is a tool . . . as good or as bad as the man
using it.”142 The discretionary procedures for vetting experts are also
tools, no better or worse than the court using them. Like any powerful
tool they can be subject to abuse in the wrong hands, but this is not a
concern that should stay the hand of the Alaska court system.

CONCLUSION
Experts are not like other witnesses. They can offer conclusions and
discuss factual details of a case even though they have no firsthand
knowledge of events and would otherwise be excluded as incompetent.
Likewise, hybrid fact/expert witnesses, such as treating physicians,
have enormous power to sway a case one way or the other. The court
system’s own rules of evidence make this testimony possible, and the
courts bear the responsibility of making sure this broad leeway is not
abused. The adversarial process itself offers strong protections against
charlatans and mere hired guns, but it is too constrained in open court to
be the exclusive safeguard. The court itself must make an initial
determination of fit and reliability whenever expert testimony is
proffered. Moreover, the court should be permitted to question whether
experts are needed at all, or if the jury can be trusted to come to its own
conclusions. This process does not interfere with the adversarial process
or with the jury’s role; instead, it ensures that the court-issued
imprimatur does not become an open-ended license. The approach
taken by early decisions in Alaska should serve as the foundation for
establishing a new, common-sense approach that is not beholden to the
latest federal trends.

141. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
142. SHANE (Paramount Pictures 1953).

